Democratic International
A “Jamboree” of anti-communist guerrillas in war-torn Angola – the Democratic International remains a symbol for Jack Abramoff’s Apartheid collusion and the basis for Dolph Lundgren’s Red Scorpion.
1981 Seychelles Affair
November 25, 1981
A botched coup d’état orchestrated by South African mercenary Mad Mike Hoare and intelligence agent Martin Dolinchek, the 1981 Seychelles Affair remains a piece of Cold War history shrouded in lies and incompetence.
Background for Context
A coup d’état, colloquially shortened to “coup”, is the sudden and often violent seizure of political power. In the latter years of the Cold War, such shifts in authority became frequent throughout the contestable developing world. The Indian Ocean, regarded as the most geopolitically significant developing region for Suez Canal access and Middle Eastern oil reserves, had come into focus for both Cold War coalitions. Because of this heightened importance, nations in this region were subject to intense meddling and intervention – whether internally or externally rooted – to curb favor toward a certain political faction aligned with a given Cold War ideology. The most common tool for forcing this “curb” was the coup d’état.
A relevant example was the June 1977 Seychelles coup in which sixty Tanzanian-trained Seychellois exiles ousted sitting president James Mancham while he attended a Commonwealth meeting in London. The insurgents subsequently installed the socialist-leaning prime minister, Albert Rene, as president of the Seychelles. While Rene’s policies were rather popular amongst the nation’s populace, his socialist and assumed Soviet sympathies were of great concern to Western nations and their local allies – notably the United States and South Africa. Their concerns were later legitimized by Rene’s Non-Aligned gestures and Seychellois militants training with Socialist-aligned Tanzanian and Algerian advisors – confirming the Seychelles as a potential launchpad for Sovietism in the Indian Ocean. The possibility of Soviet installations in the Seychelles frightened U.S. planners as any nullification or demotion of U.S. presence emanating from their single base on Diego Garcia island would allow the Soviets great flexibility in projecting their power. The South Africans, with a similar fear of socialism – which tended to conflate with communism – faced their greatest ally with whom they shared considerable military resources, becoming a secondary player in the Indian Ocean and southern African regions. Both nations bore a stake in the great game.
To destabilize potential developing Seychelles-Soviet relations, the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) devised a coup in 1979 in which “researchers” stationed at a U.S. satellite tracking station located in the Seychelles – a remnant program from the Mancham administration – would take over the archipelago. Unfortunately for the CIA, the coup was uncovered; the Seychellois promptly deported all 120 Americans working at the station. The U.S. ambassador to Kenya and U.S. Charge d’affairs to the Seychelles were also implicated in the plot – rapidly deteriorating U.S.-Seychelles relations. Ironically, this falling out gave way for the Soviets to install resources throughout the archipelagic state. One notable installation was a sizable embassy chaired by Mikhail Orlov – a KGB head who previously directed Soviet operations in Turkey. The appointment of Orlov, the Soviet’s diplomatic and intelligence cavalry, as U.S.S.R. ambassador to the Seychelles showed a clear recognition of the archipelago’s value. As a final blow of retaliation, Rene invited 100 North Korean advisors to aid military development – undoubtedly angering Western officials.
In a last-ditch effort to reclaim the momentum behind the 1979 Seychelles coup attempt, CIA Deputy Director of (Covert) Operations Max Hugel proposed a large-scale plan to the United States House Intelligence Committee in August 1981 that supposedly aimed to topple Libyan Dictator Muammar Gaddafi. Certain members of the viewing Committee believed the objective implied Gaddafi’s assassination and wrote strongly worded letters of condemnation to President Ronald Reagan. Around this stage, anonymous officials leaked multiple accounts of the plot to the American media – none of which aided any hypothetical CIA operation. The U.S. government later clarified the plan rather aimed to topple Libyan influence in Mauritius – an island nation off the east African coast undergoing socialist swings. Despite this clarification, another supposed U.S. source muddled the facts, stating the intended target was the West African nation of Mauritania, not Mauritius. Later, evidence revealed Mauritania was not the target of a CIA operation but the victim of mistaken identity due to the two African nations’ somewhat similar names. In actuality, the CIA was concerned about Libyan influence on the socialist movements in Mauritius, particularly with the ruling Mauritius Militant Movement party. By this time, press exposure and the general political controversy surrounding the CIA forced them to heavy-handedly deal with Libya while subtly shifting focus back onto the Seychelles. However, unlike previous attempts, the CIA passed operational responsibility onto their allies in South Africa.
Since 1978, the South African government had been in contact with pro-West Seychellois exiles and intervened in nations neighboring the Seychelles. One such case was the South African and Rhodesian-backed coup of the Comoros islands by a team of French mercenaries under the command of famed soldier-of-fortune Bob Denard. The group seized control of the state from its failing socialist government – much to the populace’s avail. Shortly thereafter, the nation’s former leader Ali Soilih died under mysterious circumstances and Denard installed a puppet government that granted South Africa the right to construct various military installations. These ranged from forward bases used to arm militants in Mozambique to Project Advokaat “Silvermine” – a nautical recording system to track ships. The success of the Comoros operation, evidenced by the construction of these various installations, proved to the South Africans that if handled right, a coup d’état could succeed in toppling a socialist government. With this thought, plans for a mercenary-led, Comoros-style coup of the Seychelles began being drafted by South African officials in early 1980.
A political map depicting the locations of the Seychelles, Kenya, Diego Garcia island, the Comoros, Tanzania, Mauritius, Madagascar, Mozambique, Swaziland, and South Africa. While not displayed, Mauritania is situated approximately 3600 miles northwest of Kenya.
Source : Central Intelligence Agency
Indian Ocean Map, Covert Action Information Bulletin, March 1982
A Mad Man’s Job
Planning started in the intelligence ranks with former Bureau of State Security and current National Intelligence Service (NIS) agent Martin Dolinchek assigned to handle logistics. In this role, he recruited “Mad Mike” Hoare, an Irish WWII infantryman turned South African businessman and soldier of fortune. By the late 1970s, Hoare’s mercenary escapades during the Congo Crisis had become the stuff of military pop culture – made famous through his memoirs and associated films such as The Wild Geese. Given Mad Mike’s celebrity, his recruitment for the “ideally” low-profile operation seems foolish in retrospect. Nevertheless, the 61-year-old mercenary’s combat experience likely blanketed any doubts Dolinchek possessed.
After a short series of meetings, both men reached a mutual understanding: Hoare would devise a clandestine entry into the Seychelles while Dolinchek managed the political and intelligence connections supporting a coup. Under this arrangement, they formulated a plan in coordination with Seychellois exiles Gerard Hoarau and Paul Chow – presenting it to the South African Cabinet. For undisclosed reasons, the Cabinet denied their initial proposal; one can infer the rest of South African intelligence was now aware of the plot. After a few hasty amendments, Prime Minister P. W. Botha approved the plan with one caveat – Dolinchek had to cede commanding authority. This demotion resulted from an internal scuffle between the NIS and Military Intelligence (MI) for control of the Seychelles invasion. NIS and MI ultimately compromised – leading to Military Intelligence taking charge of the operation while Dolinchek acted as an NIS liaison, keeping everything in check.
Whether intentional or not, Dolinchek’s demotion inversely promoted Mad Mike Hoare – allowing the bombastic mercenary to absorb his NIS counterpart’s prior responsibilities. In a largely careless effort, Hoare is said to have adjusted plans and hired friends from previous military ventures. One of these men, Jeremiah Puren, was widely considered a NIS agent, directly linking the plotters to the South African government – a no-go for covert operations. In addition, Dolinchek visited Hoare’s Durban residence numerous times in preparation for the coup – connecting the South African agent to the famed mercenary. To seemingly ensure the implication of South African officials, Hoare also hired members of South African and Rhodesian Special Service groups like the Red Devils – a paramilitary known for conducting raids in Mozambique and Angola on behalf of South African intelligence. Bringing in these brothers in arms, the mercenary captain unknowingly ignited a gossip firestorm that ended up as rumors spread throughout Durban bars. It may be because of this “open-secret” style of planning that the CIA learned of South Africa’s ongoing Seychelles plan and decided to relinquish operation responsibility to their sub-saharan allies in mid-1981.
Despite Hoare’s “open secret”, he and his hired guns finalized planning by late 1981. However, due to the secretive, manipulative, and sloppy nature of the individuals involved – the specifics of said plan can only be inferred. What is certain is Hoare divided his mercenaries into two groups, an advance team of 9 and an invasion force of roughly 44. Distributed amongst both groups would be – ironically – 75 to 80 Soviet Kalashnikov rifles possibly supplied by Saudi arms dealer Adnan Khashoggi. The celebrity dealer also was a likely contributor of funds for the Seychelles coup; it is unclear whether those materialized in the weapons acquired by Hoare or elsewhere in the proposed $5 million budget.
Presumably, the advance team was supposed to smuggle roughly half the arms to disgruntled Seychellois to kickstart rebellion against the Rene government. The remaining guns, approximately 44 rifles, were to be distributed amongst the invasion force. For concealment, the weapons would be hidden under false bottoms in the mercenaries’ duffle bags. To appear amiable, the men planned to fill the rest of their bags with children’s toys and portray themselves as members of a charitable beer club called the Ancient Order of the Froth Blowers (AOBF). While it is unlikely anyone the mercenaries encountered knew, the AOBF was an obscure and long-defunct charitable drinking club based in London whose members were notably – former soldiers. It was as if Hoare was tempting fate by leaving these subtle traces.
One day before the coup, the invasion team – disguised as Froth Blowers – would travel by bus to Matshapa Airport in Swaziland. Once there, the mercenaries intended to board a chartered Royal Swazi Fokker F-28 destined for the Seychelles. Upon arriving on the main island, the invasion team would pass through security at Mahe International Airport, later meeting with the advance team. This group planned on arriving roughly two weeks before the invasion force, buying the nine plotters enough time to distribute weapons and build a forward base in rented villas located near the old U.S. satellite tracking station. Together, the invasion and advance teams were to secure key government buildings, military installations, and infrastructure – hoping such efforts would topple the Rene government within days. If Hoare succeeded, former Seychelles President James Mancham would have been flown in from Kenya to reassume his office. It seems likely he would have remained a puppet to the South African government, possibly kept under close supervision by Hoare as Bob Denard had with the client Comoros administration.
A photo of South African Red Devils commando Chris Hillebrand, also referred to as Christo Hillesbran, training at a South African combat school. Hillebrand would be one of approximately eleven Red Devils soldiers active during the Seychelles coup.
Source : Central Intelligence Agency
Chris Hillebrand Handgun Training, Unknown Photographer, March 1982
The Seychelles Coup
With Hoare setting the invasion date to November 25, 1981, the advance team departed earlier in the month. However, they were possibly short of at least two people. According to Dolinchek, Hoare requested his brother-in-law, Robert Sims, and his in-law’s wife, Susan Ingles, travel to the Seychelles several months before the invasion. Each person would open a bank account and deposit approximately $10,000 at the instruction of Hoare. While Dolinchek did not explicitly say, he loosely implied the money was for renting villas on Mahe island. While this may be true, Dolinchek was a liar by trade – making the sole existence of these two accounts dubious. Nevertheless, the remaining advance team members – including Dolinchek – arrived in the Seychelles through unknown means. Each member carried weapons, likely Kalashnikovs, and identifying documents linking them to the South African government. The plotters would devote little effort to stowing these items away; many left their contraband haphazardly around the rented villas.
By daybreak of November 24, at least 39 invasion force members had assembled in Johannesburg – a metropolitan located proximally close to the Swazi border. Once organized, the mercenaries adopted their Froth Blower disguises – later resting at a local Holiday Inn while presenting as hospitable alcohol connoisseurs. Each member presumably possessed a concealed rifle and respective duffle bag by the following morning. By then, each mercenary and their duffle was on a bus headed for Swaziland’s Matsapha Airport. Waiting on the tarmac was a charted Royal Swazi Fokker F-28 – fueled for a one-way flight to the Seychelles.
The plane lifted off shortly before noon. Approximately halfway through the flight, Hoare ordered an unscheduled landing in the South African-allied Comoros islands. On the ground, multiple sources claim between two and five additional mercenaries boarded the Royal Swazi Fokker; with them came crates labeled “Gifts for Handicapped Children”. Ironically, these “charitable gifts” contained roughly 100 rockets and appropriate shoulder-mounted launchers, 40 hand grenades, and 24,000 rounds of rifle ammunition intended for the invasion. Hoare’s choice to air-freight firepower – whether rockets or rifles – instead of utilizing foolproof sea-smuggling techniques revealed his “shoe-string” budget. The subpar workarounds induced by this lackluster budget would ultimately unfold the entire scheme.
The chartered plane took off once more, landing at the Seychelles’ Mahe International Airport around 5:30 p.m. All 44 “Froth Blowers” quickly disembarked with their duffles, striding briskly to gate security while avoiding Seychellois police. However, these actions only garnered the mercenaries more attention – leading airport security to thoroughly examine the men. One by one, each member was ordered to unzip their bag – presenting its contents to the monitoring customs officer. This process efficiently moved along until the official reached the second to last man in line, SADF “Recce 2” commando Johan Fritz. Accidentally, Fritz had jostled his bag in transit, causing the barrel of his rifle to poke through the false bottom of his bag. When the Seychellois officer sifted beneath the vanity of children’s toys, he saw the rifle barrel staring at him and panicked – bolting to trigger a nearby alarm.
Immediately, the mercenaries produced their weapons – shooting at the fleeing customs officer. Unfortunately for Hoare, only Johan Fritz would be killed in his exchange – possibly due to friendly fire. With their plan up in smoke, the mercenaries hastily grabbed 70 hostages from nearby terminals and lounges – hoping to secure bargaining chips. By now, heavily armed Seychellois soldiers began amassing on the runway and were taking potshots at the bunkering mercenaries. The commotion also drew in Dolinchek and combat-inclined advance team members. With the addition of more men, Hoare believed he could quickly overpower the unorganized Seychellois with a devastating assault on Pointe La Rue – a military base bordering the airstrip. Hoare soon discovered he was sorely mistaken. His men had failed to gain substantial ground in their assault, wasting ammunition and causing American soldier-of-fortune Charles Dukes to suffer a gunshot wound. Making matters worse, a Seychellois soldier killed during the Pointe La Rue raid assumably developed a collective vengeance amongst the defending combatants. This emotion would culminate in the destruction of Hoare’s Royal Swazi plane by Seychellois forces – effectively trapping the mercenaries on Mahe island.
Around 11:30 p.m., a Boeing 707 carrying Air India Flight 224 began descending toward Mahe International Airport for a prescheduled refueling. After six hours of combat, Hoare spotted the incoming aircraft and hurriedly concocted a ploy fitting for his “Mad Mike” moniker. First, Hoare ordered his men to seize the air traffic control tower. Once inside, the mercenaries posed as air traffic control officers – inexplicably convincing the Air India pilot to land despite warning flares and airstrip blocks from the Seychelles military. As Flight 224 touched down, the plane scraped against one such airstrip block – leaving superficial damage on the Boeing’s exterior. Hoare, recognizing the opportunity, sent his second in command, Peter Duffy, across the tarmac. The seasoned mercenary walked up the plane’s passenger steps and brandished his rifle. Begrudgingly, the flight crew granted Duffy entry – letting Hoare’s men swiftly hijack the aircraft. Hoare would employ the alias “Tom” when negotiating with the pilot; the two ultimately agreed to alter course for Durban. Flight 224 soon departed with 44 mercenaries and two casualties on board. Left behind were Dolinchek and two soldiers; they were to guard the hostages – the only civilian eyewitnesses to Hoare’s escape. By daybreak of November 26, one hostage had escaped and informed authorities of the mercenaries’ flight. Seychellois soldiers subsequently stormed the airport – apprehending Dolinchek and his associates. In addition, police arrested plotters residing at the villas – revealing a stockpile of illegal weapons and incriminating documents. As his coup lay in tatters, Hoare openly discussed the details within earshot of Flight 224’s passengers. He had little understanding of the political firestorm waiting for him in Durban.
A photo of the items seized by either Seychellois or South African police following the raid. As evident, the image displays several “AK” pattern Kalashnikov rifles spread across the floor and resting against the wall. Assorted on the floor are rifle magazines, bullets, and children’s toys – including play tea sets, plastic race cars, and balloons. Attached to the duffle bag are logos with a frothing beer mug inscribed with the acronym “A.O.F.B.”. This, of course, stands for Order of the Ancient Froth Blowers.
Source : Tony Mathiot
1981 Seychelles Coup Seized Weapons and Charitable Gifts, Unknown Photographer, Circa 1981
A video captured by Associated Press (AP) reporters depicting the damage to Mahe International Airport following the failed Seychelles coup. For details on given timestamps:
2:43 – The exterior of Mahe International Airport’s control tower is displayed, revealing extensive damage and suggesting Hoare’s men were under heavy fire.
4:38 – The Royal Swazi Fokker F-28 that Hoare’s men chartered from Swaziland is parked at the runway’s end. The aircraft’s fuselage is peppered with shrapnel marks and holes; the wheels and turbine engines have been shot out and immobilized.
7:41 – Mahe International Airport’s passenger reception and security check, where the firefight broke out, is shown to be in shambles.
12:45 – An armored vehicle owned by the Seychellois military is parked out front of Mahe International Airport. Spent ammunition casings can be seen on the ground nearby, evidence of a prolonged firefight with Hoare’s mercenaries.
Source : AP Archive on Youtube
8203 – SEYCHELLES: ATTEMPTED COUP AND WHITE MERCENARIES, Associated Press reporters, 26 November 1981
Consequences or Lack Thereof
Stepping foot on the Durban airstrip, South African police detained Hoare’s returning mercenaries. After brief interrogations and dealmaking, only Hoare and four close associates received charges under the Civil Aviation Offenses Act relating to air traffic regulations and kidnapping. The five accomplices would later make bail, joining the remaining thirty-nine who escaped prosecution. Despite avoiding coup-related charges, the mercenaries felt their entry into the legal system was a betrayal by South African intelligence operatives looking to distance themselves from the operation. In addition, Hoare’s celebrity status allowed South African intelligence to place responsibility on a famous face – providing the media with a convenient scapegoat. In effect, the mercenaries believed (and correctly so) that the reluctant South African bureaucracy abandoned them to absolve itself of Seychelles-coup guilt – thereby upholding South Africa’s international democratic posturing. Thirty-eight years after the incident, mercenary Louis Dekker reflected: “The South African government simply turned their backs on us and did not want anything to do with us, denying any involvement in the attempted coup.”
As the mercenaries’ resentment festered, Hoare was in court – disputing the minor charges levied against him and his four fellow accused. During proceedings, Defense Minister (General) Magnus Malan barred 25 witnesses, all ex-SADF soldiers, from testifying on military activities before November 24, 1981 – the day before the attack. Malan’s gaming of the legal system withheld crucial evidence from the court – allowing Hoare and his accomplices to escape grave sentences. The international reaction to these lax punishments was “swift and vitriolic”. World leaders condemned South Africa; many cited the lack of air piracy charges as blatant hypocrisy.
Since 1972, South Africa had projected itself as the foremost opponent to hijacking – imposing 5-year mandatory minimum sentences with possible 30-year imprisonments. This tough-on-crime stance emerged from the Apartheidistic fear of aggrieved Black minorities hijacking state-sponsored South African Airways flights. Charging Hoare’s predominately White force with kidnapping, an offense without minimum sentencing requirements, instead of air piracy indicated racial bias to many. Considering the racist scaffolding that upheld the Apartheid platform, these accusations were not unfounded. However, stated evidence tells mercenary-intelligence collusion likely preceded any racial considerations. Nevertheless, international pressure emanating from condemnations of racism, corruption, and hypocrisy forced South Africa to re-trial all 44 mercenaries with air piracy on January 5, 1982.
The re-trial proved a tell-all deal – forcing SADF higher-ups to divulge unsavory truths. Moreover, new details emerged implicating individual SADF members – two of whom were Sergeant Major van der Merwe and Commando Johannes de Beer. Van der Merwe disclosed a personal delivery of Kalashnikov rifles to Hoare on October 6, adding substance to the Khashoggi-South African deal. De Beer, an officer of 11 mercenaries during the Seychelles raid, disclosed he had used official military call-up forms to recruit his men – linking South African military personnel with Hoare’s botched job. Unfazed by public revelations, or in disbelief of his predicament, Hoare blithely autographed copies of his memoir Mercenary during trial breaks. The judge concluded by validating the testimony of van der Merwe and de Beer, further reflecting on the proximity of NIS, MI, and Dolinchek to the Seychelles coup attempt. “Mad Mike” Hoare ultimately received a ten-year sentence, of which he would only serve three. The remaining plotters, including Peter Duffy and Italian actor Tullio Moneta, were sentenced to five years or less; the majority served fewer than six months.
As the media circus dissipated, the Apartheid regime acknowledged a U.N. directive for all aggressing parties to finance the reconstruction of Mahe International Airport. The projected cost was $17.6 million; the commission also estimated lost tourist revenue raised total economic damages to $30 million, a staggering amount on a $155 million GDP. It remains unclear whether Mahe International Airport was reconstructed with South African funds. As these million-dollar redevelopment figures swept headlines, South African Foreign Affairs Minister Pik Botha quietly agreed to transfer $3 million directly to Albert Rene’s in exchange for the captured mercenaries. By mid-1983, Dolinchek and the “South African seven” were released under pardon; most would walk away in silence – Dolinchek chose to flagrantly express remorse by flaming the regime. The NIS agent, however deceitful his intent, reported he and Robert Sims had tested the Kalashnikovs obtained from Major Sergeant van der Merwe in broad daylight at Durban’s Airport while under South African supervision. He also flaunted his false passport to the media, revealing the Durban Department of the Interior had expressly issued the fraudulent document.
Using this information, the U.N. Commission opened further inquiries, finding cooperative authority ended with General Pieter van der Westhuizen, Chief of Staff Intelligence. Under examination, the General retorted the U.N. investigators’ assertions, asserting most South African mercenaries had SADF ties due to mandatory conscription legislation. While ostensibly sound, the Intelligence Chief’s explanation failed to justify the involvement of special service and intelligence groups. With further direction from Dolinchek, Probing investigators additionally found that for “safety”, South African police destroyed 38 rifles, 2,435 rounds of ammunition, and three hand grenades confiscated from the Air India hijackers.
Despite all his stick-waving, the South African security apparatus reabsorbed Dolinchek in the years following his public spat. Presumably, NIS higher-ups figured he had less potential to inflict organizational damage while under cross-supervision as an intelligence agent. Opposing Dolinchek’s path was that of “Mad Mike” Hoare. Upon his 1985 release, he openly renounced his violent occupation and arranged a doorstep news conference to thank Albert Rene for pardoning his men. The formerly bombastic mercenary would return to a leisurely life of accounting, auto sales, and writing – recanting his bloody days of yore until his death in February 2020.
A photo of the local media interviewing plotters of the 1981 Seychelles coup attempt. From left to right: South African Martin Dolinchek, Zimbabwean Roger England, Briton Bernard Stanley Carey, Zimbabwean Aubrey Frank Vincent Brooks, South African Robert Sims, and South African Jeremiah Cornelius Puren. Of these men, Dolinchek and Puren had affiliations with NIS – the rest had connections with “Mad Mike” Hoare or the South African Army. As a side note, Dolinchek frequented the alias “Anton Lubic”; it remains unclear whether the pseudonym was used by the NIS agent during the Seychelles invasion.
Source : Review of the African Political Economy
Seychellois Plotters Interviewed, Unknown Photographer, Circa 1982
An excerpt from Volume 2, Chapter 2, Subsection 44 of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s (TRC) final report in which the investigators detail their conclusions regarding the 1981 Seychelles coup attempt. As previously stated, the report emphasizes the significance of South African intelligence to the operation – naming specific top NIS and MI figures who green-lit the attack. Unfortunately, the TRC amnesty agreements that brought this information to light also let the guilty walk away without repercussion. Additionally, it is important to note the Seychellois citizen killed was the soldier Hoare’s mercenaries shot while assaulting Pointe La Rue.
“THE COMMISSION FINDS THAT THE ATTEMPT TO OVERTHROW THE SEYCHELLES GOVERNMENT WAS AN OPERATION UNDERTAKEN BY SENIOR OPERATIVES OF THE NIS AND THE DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE WITH THE COLLUSION OF ELEMENTS WITHIN THE SADF. AS SUCH, IT WAS A VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND AN INFRINGEMENT OF THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE SEYCHELLES GOVERNMENT. THE DEATH OF A SEYCHELLOIS CITIZEN IN THE OPERATION WAS A GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION.
FOR THESE ACTS, THE COMMISSION FINDS THE FOLLOWING TO BE ACCOUNTABLE IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS HEADS OF AGENCIES OF THE STATE DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE OPERATION: PRIME MINISTER PW BOTHA, MINISTER OF DEFENCE GENERAL MAGNUS MALAN, HEAD OF THE OFFICE OF CHIEF OF STAFF INTELLIGENCE LIEUTENANT GENERAL PW VAN DER WESTHUIZEN, AND THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.”
Source : South Africa Department of Justice and Constitutional Development
TRC Final Report, (Volume 2, Chapter 2, Section 44), Desmond Tutu & the TRC, 29 October 1998
James Mancham & Kenya
In an innocuous passage, the U.N. report mentioned two audio tapes discovered on the runway of Mahe International Airport. Although the recordings are lost, U.N. investigators reported the tapes stored addresses spoken by former Seychelles leader James Mancham in which he summons the Seychellois people to embrace him as president. The commission concluded the audio tapes were likely a dropped mercenary possession; further remarking on Hoare’s intent to broadcast the messages from a captured radio station. When questioned, Mancham stated an unnamed individual – likely Hoare – approached him at London’s Churchill Hotel with a $3.5 million plot to overthrow the Rene administration. According to Mancham, their violent intentions induced hesitation over contributing capital. Instead, the former president appeased the plotters by recording multiple audio messages by telephone to support their coup. To Mancham, the situation was most advantageous. If the plotters succeeded, he could return to power; if the coup failed, he would continue living his lavish “playboy lifestyle” in London – far separated from the troubles of his home nation. In a fitting irony, later reports revealed Mancham was on a lecture tour during the coup, speaking on “The Struggle For Power in the Indian Ocean”. Similar investigations by South African and Seychellois police also uncovered “Mad Mike” Hoare and Adnan Khashoggi were dear friends of Mancham – indicating the former president may have connected buyer and seller for the Kalashnikov deal. Mancham’s tape-recording admission also confirmed the former president had prior knowledge of the 1981 Seychelles coup and was willing to oust Rene to reclaim his presidential seat.
Further inquiries into Mancham’s role exposed Kenyan coordination with South African interests. According to Dolinchek, two planes carrying Kenyan police would fly to the Seychelles upon Hoare’s triumph – disarming guarding Tanzanian troops and installing James Mancham as president. While Dolinchek’s claim is suspect, Seychellois police found documents on the NIS agent detailing the flight of a chartered “Sunbird Aviation” Beechcraft Super Kingair 200 from Mombasa to the Comoros on November 24. The aircraft would depart from the Comoros on November 26, flying to the Seychelles with “five American tourists using the names: Mr. and Mrs. Morgan, Mr. and Mrs. Bowman and Mr. Nescott. Only these were fake names. The first two were in fact James Mancham and his wife”. Lending Dolinchek some credibility, Kenyan troops were to accompany Mancham – easing his re-entry into power.
Muddling the narrative, former spy and pilot Bill Parkinson owned the Super Kingair 200. Parkinson was also an employee at Boskovic Air Charters Limited – a business partially owned by Kenyan President Charles Njonjo. At Njonjo’s request, Parkinson leased his plane through a shelf company called Executive Jets Ltd. to Sunbird Aviation – an air-chartering company owned by the Kenyan President’s “personal fixer”, Lord Andrew Cole, the seventh Earl of Enniskillen. The ownership transfer permitted the aircraft to receive Seychellois air clearance. With the books set, James Mancham sent Seychellois allies Gerard Hoarau and Paul Chow to Nairobi’s 680 Hotel to meet with Kenyan collaborators representing Njonjo. Both parties agreed to maintain a forward base in the 680 Hotel. Hoareau soon booked a flight with Sunbird Aviation for Mancham; Njonjo appointed Bill Parkinson to pilot the Super Kingair 200. Due to the ineptitude of Hoare’s planning, Parkinson’s plane never had the chance to take off. In the aftermath, Parkinson escaped international scrutiny and continued his aviation career, founding Phoenix Aviation in 1994 with his son Steve. This venture proved lucrative, leading to Frontier Services Group acquiring the chartering service in mid-2014. Frontier Services Group, operated by notorious Blackwater founder Erik Prince, also purchased a complementing airline, Kijipwa Aviation, to substantiate Phoenix Aviation’s fleet. In a deal with South Sudanese Dictator Salva Kiir, Prince agreed to weaponize Thrush 510G crop dusters and supply Phoenix Aviation and Kijipwa Aviation aircraft to aid logistics in the Sudanese conflict. However, the two military men had a falling out – leaving the single modified crop duster to rust and remain a relic of Bill Parkinson’s fascinating escapades.
Craig Williamson & Loose Ends
Giovanni Mario Ricci was born to parents Ettore and Jolanda on August 7, 1929, outside Lucca, Italy. As a young man, Ricci faced numerous financial woes and brazenly defrauded many – forcing him to flee to Switzerland in 1958. There, the middle-aged Ricci found himself entangled with counterfeit currency schemes – compelling the expatriate to seek solace in Latin America. After brief stints living in Mexico and Haiti, Ricci rekindled his entrepreneurial spirit, establishing a grapefruit exporting company in Somalia. Like his previous ventures, the grapefruit business was racked with mismanagement and fraud – impelling Somali officials to expel Ricci in 1974. With few places to turn, the unscrupulous businessman sought Seychellois residency – later befriending President Albert Rene. The Seychelles President, impressed with Ricci’s purportedly “successful” foreign ventures, promoted the expatriate as the nation’s foremost “business diplomat”. In his faux-diplomatic capacity, Ricci and the Seychelles government co-established the Seychelles Trust Company – a tax-exempt exporting business with alleys into the Seychellois bureaucracy. In effect, Ricci had transformed the Seychelles into the first “socialist tax haven” and gained near complete control of a state-backed exporting business – permitting him to exercise his con-artistry on a grander scale.
After the 1981 Seychelles plot, Rene sweetened Ricci’s deal when he was granted sole ownership of the Seychelles Trust Company in exchange for his assistance in developing national security. Jovial with his newly-acquired power, Ricci rashly paid private investigators to surveil dissident Seychellois exiles – clearing himself of the task. At this time, (former) South African intelligence officer Craig Williamson recognized Ricci’s proximity to President Rene. By 1986, Williamson established cordial business relations with Ricci, allowing the intelligence agent access to President Rene’s inner circle. To diffuse South African intelligence suspicions, Williamson founded a shelf company in Jersey called Longreach that projected a European background. Williamson also assisted Ricci in establishing GMR, an exporting company boldly named after the expatriated Italian’s initials. Ricci subsequently enlisted Williamson as managing director of GMR, proving to Rene the trust his “business diplomat” had in the South African.
In August 1986, South African intelligence abandoned a fledgling plot involving British ex-Seychellois conspiring with a South African diplomat in London. To appear supportive of Rene’s office, South Africa turned the details over to the Seychellois government – claiming they had uncovered and foiled the plot to protect the vulnerable nation’s sovereignty. South Africa’s ostensibly generous disclosure of information was just another step in a post-1981 plan to acquire influence through diplomacy, not firepower. Williamson was the facilitator of said plan. Until the Apartheid regime collapsed in 1994, the former intelligence officer actively sought to normalize Seychellois-South African business relations – frequently for the benefit of South African intelligence operatives. Such benefits manifested as precious ivory and rhino tusks, illegal arms, and dirty money smuggled into South Africa through Williamson and Ricci’s exporting companies. In addition, South African intelligence established over 200 other shelf businesses to smuggle illegal commodities throughout Africa. These transactions kept capital flowing through the Seychelles, settling contentions between the two nations. In addition, public-facing South African officials had managed to wean Rene away from his staunched socialist policies toward ones less attractive to prying Soviet (or Russian) eyes – thereby easing Seychellois-South African political tensions entering the twenty-first century.
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