1981 Seychelles Affair
A botched coup d’état orchestrated by South African mercenary Mad Mike Hoare and intelligence agent Martin Dolinchek, the 1981 Seychelles Affair remains a piece of Cold War history shrouded in lies and incompetence.
Sino-Indian War
October 20, 1962 – November 20, 1962
A contentious border dispute turned conflict would reshape the boundaries of South Asia, only overshadowed by the nuclear crisis unfolding half a world over.
Background for Context
Historically, the borders of the Indian subcontinent have been vaguely defined. After years in power, the British Raj of India had failed to formally demarcate the shared border with the Chinese Qing Dynasty. The three sections of the boundary, western, middle, and eastern, were individually contested as the two imperial powers attempted to advance their territorial gains. The British 1865 Johnson Line incorporated approximately one-third of the western Aksai Chin region into the Indian territory of Kashmir. The line became accepted as part of the Sino-Indian border despite the Qing authorities having no say in the revision. By 1892, the westward advancing Chinese had retaken the vacant Aksai Chin plains. Losing their declared territory, the British proposed the 1899 MacDonald Line to reclaim a portion of the region. The MacDonald line also became accepted by the international community although it lacked formal recognition from the Qing Dynasty. Following the collapse of imperial China and the subsequent Simla Convention of 1913 and 1914, the British felt unsatisfied with the Chinese rejection of their border proposals. Subverting Beijing, the British initiated negotiations with the Tibetan government. The resulting McMahon Line sectioned vast amounts of land on the eastern border into the British Raj’s control. The Chinese would reject these claims, maintaining that any agreement with the “illegitimate” Tibetan government is by definition invalid. Two important connections resulted from these British – Tibetan negotiations. The first is that it suggested British intentions to bring Tibet into its sphere of influence or direct control. The second being it would re-solidify the cultural, specifically Buddhist, connections between India and Tibet, a relationship crucial to the Sino-Indian War.
The Partition of India
The British Raj, through decades of tyranny, had tainted their image among the Indian people. After a century of mutiny and revolt, the British prepared their withdrawal from India in 1947. In a fatal mistake, British lawyer Sir Cyril Radcliffe was tasked to demarcate the borders of the soon-to-be independent state. Radcliffe lacked key knowledge of South Asian demographics and fundamentally misunderstood the nuances of Indian society. Under a five-week deadline, he partitioned India based on the predominant religion of each principality. The Islamic regions situated in western and eastern India were separated from the state, creating the religious enclaves which would become West and East Pakistan. Dividing the nation divided the people, initiating an impassioned conflict with roots buried deep in nationalism and religion. In the carnage, 14 million people found themselves living in a place where they were no longer welcome. An estimated 500,000 to 1 million people would die migrating, seeking refuge from the violence. As India and Pakistan quelled domestic clashes, they exacerbated the foreign conflict by contesting the border region of Kashmir & Jammu. These disputes would create great upheaval throughout South Asia, setting the stage for the border conflicts of the near future.
The 1959 Tibetan Uprising
China’s 1950 annexation of Tibet strained relations with India. Tibet, one of India’s largest political and cultural allies, was now subject to Beijing’s rule. Upon annexation, increased numbers of Chinese and Indian troops mounted along the disputed Sino-Indian border. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) constructed a military road through Indian-claimed territory, further souring relations. The growing tension would turn into conflict upon the failure of the 1959 Tibetan Uprising. In March of 1959, 300,000 Tibetans encircled the Potala Palace in Lhasa. The protesters aimed to prevent the Dalai Lama’s abduction by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China. The PLA open-fired with artillery on the crowd, killing 87,000 Tibetans including the Dalai Lama’s personal guard. In the midst of the uprising, the Dalai Lama fled to India. In his path were an estimated 80,000 to 100,000 Tibetan refugees seeking asylum. To the dismay of Chairman Mao Zedong, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru granted the Tibetans refuge, including the Dalai Lama. Allowing the Dalai Lama, the catalyst of the uprising, to live in exile directly led to Mao Zedong’s lambasting of the Indian state.
A photo taken on March 17 of 1959 depicting thousands of women in Lhasa, Tibet. The Tibetans are protesting the supposed PRC plot to abduct the Dalai Lama. Source : The Guardian
Anti-Imperialist China
Communism is widely considered the ideological anthesis to capitalism. As anti-imperialist sentiments swept across the globe in the early twentieth century, the concepts of imperialism and capitalism became intertwined. As Mao Zedong rose to power, he was able to translate these notions into Chinese foreign policy. On April 24 of 1945, he declared his hopes “…that India will attain independence. For an independent and democratic India is not only needed by the Indian people but is essential for world peace.” Mao surmised that the end of British imperialist rule would improve relations with India and reduce international conflict. He failed to consider that the interests of an independent India may diverge from Chinese foreign policy. Following the annexation of Tibet, both nations attempted to mend their faltering relationship, signing the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence on April 29 of 1954. The principles detail how China and India seek to enforce “mutual respect’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence”. However, relations would once again sour near the turn of the decade when the Dalai Lama was granted Indian residency. In the wake of the Tibetan Uprising, the underlying ideological differences between Chairman Mao and Prime Minister Nehru weakened diplomatic channels, escalating an unresolved border dispute closer to conflict.
An excerpt from Mao Zedong’s conversation with Soviet Primer Nikita Khrushchev on October 2 of 1959 in which he aims to convince the Premier of China’s diplomatic goals.
“The Hindus acted in Tibet as if it belonged to them”…“You only see our ‘threatening gestures,’ and fail to see the other side [of] our struggle to pull Nehru over to our side.”
Source : Wilson Center
Mao Zedong, Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party 1949-76
Border Skirmishes
By 1959, the antagonism generated by the two building armies manifested into armed clashes. The resulting Longju and Konga Pass skirmishes would attract the ire of Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev. On October 2 of 1959, Khrushchev met with Zedong and PRC statesman Zhou Enlai. As the conversation moved toward the border crisis, Zedong asserted, “We also support Nehru, but in the question of Tibet we should crush him.” In response, the Soviet Premier bluntly replied, “Why did you have to kill people on the border with India?”. The Soviet Union, a supposed ally of China, had sided with Prime Minister Nehru. Khrushchev’s decision to challenge Zedong would be partially responsible for the Sino-Soviet split, resulting in the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union severing ties. With new allies, the Indian government began enforcing the Forward Policy in 1961. By this, Indian troops would continue to push forward into contested regions on both the western and eastern borders to establish patrol stations. In response, Chinese troops advanced to halt any Indian progress. On September 8 of 1962, Chinese troops surrounded the Indian Dhola post situated north of the McMahon Line. Believing the overlooking Thagla Ridge was Indian territory, troops fired upon the Chinese advanced. The ensuing skirmish between Indian and Chinese forces would be the precursor to the Chinese offensive.
An excerpt from Khrushchev’s conversation with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai on October 2 of 1959 in which he places blame on the PRC for the Sino-Indian border hostilities.
“It’s not a matter of arrest; I am just saying that you were wrong to let him go. If you allow him an opportunity to flee to India, then what has Nehru to do with it? We believe that the events in Tibet are the fault of the Communist Party of China, not Nehru’s fault.”
Source : Wilson Center
Nikita Khrushchev, Soviet Premier 1953-64
The Other October Crisis
In October of 1962, another crisis was brewing on the other side of the world. With Soviet ballistic missiles positioned in Cuba and the U.S. forces readied at DEFCON 2, the world seemed on the brink of nuclear war. While most nations fixated their focus on the Cuban Missile Crisis, Mao saw an opportunity in the spectacle. Taking pages from Sun Tzu’s The Art of War, Mao capitalized on his distracted enemies and struck while the iron was hot. Under a half-hearted assurance of support from Khrushchev, PLA troops moved across the western border into Aksai Chin on October 20, seizing the region within two days. Simultaneously, PLA troops swiftly advanced across the McMahon Line on the eastern border, fighting further into disputed territory. The ill-equipped Indian troops put up little resistance, many surrendering to the greater Chinese numbers. Once PLA troops reached the boundary of the disputed region, a three-week ceasefire was drawn to find a diplomatic resolution. Zhou Enlai proposed a withdrawal of twenty kilometers to each side of the McMahon Line. Nehru refused, insisting on a Chinese retreat to their previous position on September 8. With no resolution found, Indian troops fired on Chinese forces at Walong, ending the ceasefire. After a lull in the combat, a second ceasefire was drawn on November 19. The PRC had emerged as the victors, capturing thousands of square kilometers of territory. Despite this, the PLA suddenly relinquished their territorial gains and withdrew north of the McMahon Line the following day.
Understanding the Withdraw
The ceasefire was to take effect on November 21, the day following the military disengagement of Cuba. In a surprise to Zedong, the Cuban Missile Crisis ended after less than two weeks, shifting U.S. focus onto South Asia. In support of India, American President John F. Kennedy prepared to send to USS Kitty Hawk to provide military support and deterrence. Under threat of foreign intervention and wary of China’s global image, the PLA withdrew back over the McMahon Line. Despite their partial withdrawal, the Chinese took the leading role at the negotiating table. In the final agreement, China gained the Aksai Chin region while India maintained its control over the eastern border. With an end to the combat, the causality numbers revealed 1,383 Indian and 722 Chinese deaths, many from the unforgiving climate of the Himalayas. While this settlement resolved the immediate conflict, animosity would continue to permeate India and China’s relations.
A photo taken during the Sino-Indian War depicting Indian soldiers surrendering to PLA forces. Source : ThePrint
Overshadowed & Consequential
The Sino-Indian War is commonly overshadowed by the Cuban Missile Crisis, a situation with higher stakes. While the armed standoff in Cuba was certainly important, that is not to diminish the significance of the Sino-Indian War. As previously stated, the war was partially responsible for the Sino-Soviet split. The division became evident in 1955 when Khrushchev introduced the slogan “Hindi rusi bhai bhai”, translating to “Indians and Russians are brothers”. Despite claiming neutrality in Asian affairs, the Soviets would proceed to launch an initiative to equip India with MiG-21 fighter jets, reaffirming the brotherly bond. The MiG program was welcomed by Nehru who was criticized for the lack of Indian resistance during the conflict. This criticism would compel Nehru to modernize the military, making the Indian state combat-ready along growing points of contention. As hostilities settled with China, attention shifted to bordering Pakistan. In 1963, Pakistan transferred territory claimed by India into Chinese control. From there, China began equipping Pakistan with arms and nuclear materials. While the relationship between China and Pakistan was weak, the Indian-Pakistani border was to become the next hotbed of hostility during the Cold War. Over the following decades, disputes over the contested Kashmir region would result in military buildup at the Indian-Pakistani border. This armed bravado would sow the seeds of the unrest and contempt currently found in the contested regions of India and Pakistan.
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