Cuban Missile Crisis

October 15, 1962 – October 28, 1962

In October of 1962, the world stood on edge as the two greatest superpowers of the atomic age stood on the precipice of annihilation.

Background for Context

The 1938 discovery of nuclear fission by German scientists brought about a surge in interest in nuclear development. The Germans, Soviets, and Americans established nuclear programs to test the feasibility of an atomic weapon. Despite Germany’s head start, their top scientists fled from persecution due to their Jewish heritage. Invaded by the Germans in 1941, what little progress the Soviets were making was halted to focus research on conventional armaments. Separated by the Atlantic, the Americans kept the war far from home. This advantage made them the only power with the scientific minds and industrial backing to fully fund nuclear weapons research. Induced by a letter from Albert Einstein, a galvanized President Franklin D. Roosevelt began funding atomic research under the Manhattan Project. By 1945, the United States had displayed the effectiveness of atomic weapons on the world stage, prompting the Soviets to resume their research. In 1949, the Soviets tested their first successful atomic weapon, stripping the United States of its atomic monopoly. Under the threat of nuclear domination, both the Soviet Union and the United States began to drastically bulk up their arsenals. This marked the genesis of the nuclear age and the onset of the arms race that would define the latter half of the twentieth century.

The Monroe Doctrine & Rio Pact of 1947

In 1823, U.S. President James Monroe gave his annual address to Congress in which he declared that European colonization in the Americas would no longer be tolerated. Unknown to Monroe, his statement would form the backbone of U.S. foreign policy in the Americas for the next two centuries. In 1904, President Theodore Roosevelt expanded the Monroe Doctrine, again placing it in the public eye. Subsequently, U.S. troops were sent to Latin American states throughout the early twentieth century to deter European threats to their sovereignty. Already, the U.S. was establishing itself as the protector of the Americas from foreign intrusion. Post-WWII, the U.S. sought to strengthen its hold on Latin America after multiple states aided Axis powers. In 1947, delegates from American states met in Rio de Janeiro to sign the Inter-American Defense Pact, also known as the Rio Pact. Under article three of the Rio Pact, any attack against an American state would be considered an attack against them all, establishing the mutual defense of the Americas. By this article, the United States was able to make Latin America its protectorate, thereby retaining the U.S.’s grip on Latin American politics.

An excerpt from article three of the Inter-American Defense Pact of 1947 in which each state is obligated to protect one another when attacked by a foreign power.

“The High Contracting Parties agree that an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the American States and, consequently, each one of the said Contracting Parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.”

Source : Organization of American States

Inter-American Defense Pact of 1947, Article Three

Mutually Assured Destruction

Mutually assured destruction, commonly abbreviated to MAD, is a military doctrine of deterrence that gained prominence among diplomatic strategists during the Cold War. According to doctrine, if a nuclear strike were to occur, it would be met by an immediate counterattack. A nuclear power using its arsenal would be an act of state suicide, therefore out of self-preservation, all powers are deterred from using atomic weapons. The MAD doctrine relies on the counterattack, otherwise known as the second-strike capability, of a state to retain the stalemate between nuclear powers. If a counterattack is deemed impossible, a state can attain global dominance and have greater leverage over all facets of humanity. The ability to nullify a second-strike force, known as first-strike capability, is what both the United States and the Soviet Union sought to obtain to curb global politics in their favor. Improved delivery systems, such as the long-range bomber, nuclear submarine, and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) nearly guaranteed second-strike capability to both superpowers. Despite the U.S. and Soviet Union meeting the theoretical number of weapons required to ensure second-strike capability, they continued to enlarge their arsenals. With nuclear payload increasing, states began to deploy nuclear weapons in contested regions to extend their arm of influence. Despite the lower requirements for second-strike capability, states increased weapons production to acquire global power.

An excerpt from a speech by Robert McNamara on September 18 of 1967 in which he discusses his views on MAD and the Soviet Union.

“Is the Soviet Union seriously attempting to acquire a first-strike capability against the United States? Although this is a question we cannot answer with absolute certainty, we believe the answer is no. In any event, the question itself is — in a sense — irrelevant: for the United States will maintain and, where necessary strengthen its retaliatory forces so that, whatever the Soviet Union’s intentions or actions, we will continue to have an assured-destruction capability vis a vis their society”

Source : Atomic Archive

Robert McNamara, U.S. Secretary of Defense 1961-68

Reconnaissance Over Cuba

In 1961, the U.S. launched an invasion of Cuba, failing to overthrow Fidel Castro and his communist revolutionaries. With their neighbors encroaching, Castro sought greater military assistance from their communist allies, the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union lacked the vast deployments of weapons close to their enemy’s homeland, giving the advantage to the United States. Seizing the opportunity, the Soviets began installing short and medium-range missiles on the island of Cuba, only a few hundred miles from the continental United States. This would help the Soviets even the playing field, putting their global opponent under the watch of Soviet nuclear weapons. Briefed by U.S. intelligence, President John F. Kennedy issued a public warning against further arms stockpiling in Cuba. Undeterred by Kennedy’s warning, Soviet military buildup continued on the island. This included the arrival of Il-28 jet-powered bombers, a plane capable of releasing a nuclear payload on American soil. On October 14 of 1962, an American U-2 spy plane photographed nuclear warhead-tipped missiles under construction in Cuba. The escalation of the arms race was about to heighten the stakes to those previously unfathomable.

An excerpt from John F. Kennedy’s news conference on September 13 of 1962 in which he reaffirms the core ideas of the Monroe Doctrine and Rio Pact of 1947.

“But let me make this clear once again: If at any time the Communist build-up in Cuba were to endanger or interfere with our security in any way, including our base at Guantanamo, our passage to the Panama Canal, our missile and space activities At Cape Canaveral, or the lives of American citizens in this country, or if Cuba should ever attempt to export its aggressive purposes by force or the threat of force against any nation in this hemisphere, or become an offensive military base of significant capacity for the Soviet Union, then this country will do whatever must be done to protect its own security and that of its allies.”

Source : JFK Library

John F. Kennedy, U.S. President 1961-63

One of the images taken from a U-2 spy plane on October 14 of 1962 that was sent to the White House and used to identify the Soviet Union’s nuclear installments in Cuba. Source : National Archives

Naval Quarantine of Cuba

After receiving the developed images on October 15, Kennedy called upon his cabinet to formulate a response to the looming crisis. While some cabinet members suggested a surgical airstrike, Kennedy proposed a naval blockade, or as he labeled it, a “quarantine” of Cuba. This less drastic reaction would put the U.S. on better grounds for diplomacy with the Soviets, leaving the possibility for a peaceful resolution. On October 18, Kennedy hosted a routine meeting with Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Gromyko. As Kennedy moved the topic closer to home, Gromyko insisted that the Soviet Union had no interest in assisting Cuba militarily with the intent of threatening the United States. According to the Foreign Minister, any military buildup in Cuba was solely for defensive purposes. Knowing this statement was false, Kennedy carried out the two-hour meeting without cluing in Gromyko that he knew of his lie. Despite the failed invasion of Cuba the year prior, the President affirmed the United States had no interest in meddling with the Cuban state. As Gromyko was shuffled off to the State Department dinner, Kennedy was briefed on possible methods of response. Although he was favorable toward a naval blockade, Kennedy did not decide on the matter. Instead, he chose to keep up with his previously scheduled engagements which included awarding aviation trophies and meeting with a former Japanese finance minister. Regular appearances were crucial for the Kennedy administration to not stir up public interest in the developing crisis. As officials entered and exited the State Department, reporters questioned why so many government vehicles and top-ranking officials were converging on the same location. In an attempt to diffuse curiosity, nine of the presidential advisors held their meeting in a single limousine to avoid media attention. However, in a matter of days, such efforts would be little but futile.

A CIA reference image of a Soviet R-12 (SS-4) medium range ballistic missile taken in Red Square, Moscow, Soviet Union. Source : National Archives

Kennedy’s World Address

On October 22, Kennedy publicly addressed the nation, declaring the U.S. was to enforce “…a strict quarantine on all offensive military equipment” around Cuba. Crucially, Kennedy used the term “quarantine” as opposed to “blockade”. To use the label “blockade” would legally be a declaration of war. Using the non-legally defined term “quarantine” allowed him to tread a thin line of diplomacy, balancing direct speech without forwarding aggression. Publicly preferring a diplomatic resolution, Kennedy invoked the Rio Pact of 1947 and received support from the Organization of American States (OAS) and traditional European allies. Contrary to Kennedy’s meticulously crafted image, the Pentagon was devising invasion plans for Cuba. On the same day, Kennedy sent a letter to Soviet Primer Nikita Khrushchev reaffirming U.S. standing and urging him to return all military equipment to the Soviet Union. Kennedy was playing a strategy of duality with the Soviets. On one hand, he was intimidating the Soviets with American naval power while on the other hand, encouraging a diplomatic resolution to the crisis. While incoming Soviet ships respected the bounds of the quarantine zone, further U-2 flights confirmed that military construction was continuing in Cuba.

The DEFCON Escalation

As Kennedy issued sterner warnings to the American people and the Soviet Union, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff moved military readiness to DEFCON 3. Under DEFCON 3, the U.S. Air Force was to be able to mobilize in fifteen minutes to intercept any incoming threat. On October 24, Khrushchev wrote in a letter to Kennedy that U.S. behavior was an “act of aggression which pushes mankind toward the abyss of a world nuclear-missile war”. The same day, Kennedy appeared on national television to inform the public that missile launch sites had been discovered in Cuba. Both leaders, with starker tones, were pushing themselves closer to the brink of nuclear war. Further U-2 flights over Cuba confirmed that the Soviet missile installations were near operational. Believing war was imminent, U.S. military readiness was placed on DEFCON 2, one step away from nuclear war.

Khrushchev’s Diplomatic Solution

On October 26, Khrushchev sent Kennedy a letter reading “if assurances were given that the President of the United States would not participate in an attack on Cuba and the blockade lifted, then the question of the removal or destruction of the missile sites in Cuba would then be an entirely different question”. The following day, Kennedy received another letter in which Khrushchev demanded that the U.S. remove its missile sites in Turkey, a state which bordered the Soviet Union. Both the Soviets and Americans had missiles trained on each other, locking them in a perpetual nuclear stalemate.

Cuban Crisis Averted

On October 27, a U-2 spy plane was shot down while observing Soviet military installations in Cuba. The pilot, Air Force Major Rudolf Anderson, was killed on impact. Anderson would be the only casualty resulting from the crisis. The Major’s death was kept out of the public sphere, keeping a diplomatic resolution with the Soviets favorable among the American people. Kennedy felt a growing pressure to resolve the crisis before the zero-hour of the Pentagon’s operation in Cuba. In a dangerous move, he ignored Khrushchev’s second letter, deciding to respond to the Premiers first. In Kennedy’s response, he detailed a possible disarmament of Cuba under U.N. inspection in exchange for a U.S. guarantee to never invade the island. Although Kennedy did not believe American missiles in Turkey posed an equatable threat to Soviet missiles in Cuba, he saw that it was a compromise to his advantage. The same day, U.S. Attorney General Robert Kennedy met with Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin to finalize the removal of weapons from Turkey. On October 28, Khrushchev announced Soviet missiles would be removed from Cuba. As unceremonious as the announcement was, the near-disastrous crisis had been adverted.

Arkhipov’s Fateful Decision

On October 27, the Soviet submarine B-59 surfaced to find nearby U.S. warships dropping depth charges. Unknown to the submariners, the warship was dropping signaling depth charges to surface the submarine. In the confusion, B-59 dived back into the depths to relative safety. Believing war had broken out, intense arguments engulfed the crew. Out of the three senior officers, two of them agreed to launch the nuclear torpedo. Vasily Arkhipov was the third commanding officer of B-59. He had a fateful decision to make. Either release the torpedo or challenge his peers and cancel the launch. Arkhipov chose to cancel it, allowing level heads to prevail. Without a unanimous decision from the senior officers, B-59’s nuclear payload was not launched. Unquestionably, Arkhipov saved the world from a certain MAD-induced nuclear annihilation. For a moment, Arkhipov held the fate of the world in his hand, with little agency and immense power.

The Period of Détente

As part of the negotiations between the two ambassadors, the removal of U.S. missiles from Turkey would not be linked to any Soviet withdrawal from Cuba. Despite general speculation, U.S. officials repeatedly denied such an exchange until recordings of Kennedy’s Oval Office conversations were released in October of 1987. On November 10, the President announced the Soviets were to remove all bombers from Cuba. The same day also marked the end of the U.S. naval quarantine of the island. By April of 1963, the final set of U.S. missiles was removed from Turkey, removing the last physical remnants of the most intense crisis in world history. With a diplomatic resolution found, it seems fitting that on August 5 of 1963, the United States, Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom would sign the Limited Nuclear Test Ban treaty in Moscow, initiating a period of détente for the greatest powers ever known to man.

A Cold Legacy

The Cuban Missile Crisis represents both the best and worst aspects of humanity. If it was not for the calculated speech of both Kennedy and Khrushchev, a diplomatic resolution to the crisis would not have been possible. Conversely, it was Kennedy and Khrushchev’s escalation in their speech that brought the crisis to its climax. While a peaceful resolution was found, both leaders were criticized for compromising with the perceived enemy. In an unsurprising turn, Kennedy and Khrushchev resorted to placing blame for the crisis on the opposing state to save face for their careers and their nation’s image. Despite this, both leaders had a mutual respect for one another which would last until their final days. On Kennedy’s assassination, Khrushchev would write the following to President Lyndon B. Johnson, “For my own part, I can say quite definitely that the feeling of respect for the late President never left me precisely because, like ourselves, he based his policy on a desire not to permit a military collision of the major powers which carry on their shoulders the burden of the responsibility for the maintenance of peace.” In the coldest of wars, these two men showed the warmth of their inner being, a truly remarkable display of character. Unfortunately, as the missiles which stared down on Washington and Moscow were removed, the arms race would continue until the fall of the Soviet Union in December of 1991. Understanding the near destruction both powers had almost caused, they would never directly engage for the remainder of the twentieth century. Rather, the two giants became entangled in proxy conflicts, vying for what power they could grasp, all too similar to the events which took place in October of 1962.

An excerpt taken from one of Khrushchev’s political speeches in December of 1962 in which he reprimands U.S. conduct during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

“They do not want to reconcile themselves to the idea that little Cuba dared to live and develop independently as her people wants to, and not in the way which would please the American monopolies. But the question of how people are to live, what road they are to take, is an internal matter for each people […] Seeking to justify its aggressive actions, American reaction is repeating that the crisis in the Caribbean was allegedly created by Cuba herself, adding that blame rests also with the Soviet Union, which shipped there rockets and IL-28 bombers. But is this so? It is true that we sent arms there at the request of the Cuban Government. But what motives guided us in so doing? Exclusively humanitarian motives. Cuba needed weapons as a means of deterring aggressors, and not as a means of attack. For Cuba was under a real threat of invasion.”

Source : U.K. National Archives

Nikita Khrushchev, Soviet Premier 1953-64

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Published December 29, 2022